The Government of Karnataka (GoK) is reported to be actively considering reorganisation of Bengaluru’s local governance framework by replacing the present Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Act, 2020. The basis for this initiative seems to be the report submitted by the Expert Committee on BBMP Restructuring in June 2015 with the recommendation to replace the BBMP with a cluster of five municipal corporations (MCs) in the Bengaluru metropolitan area, to ensure better quality of life for its citizens by providing quality infrastructure and services and ensuring accountability of public service providers. However, this move is fraught with distrust by many sections of the residents as it is bound to further defer the elections to the city government, which have already been delayed by nearly 4 years.  There are also reports that some sections of the political leadership apparently may be looking to exploit this opportunity to gain electoral dividends by drawing the boundaries of the prospective five MCs in a manner favourable to them. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature of the reforms proposed, whether they are adequate enough to meet the said objectives and to ensure that the government is willing to navigate the reform path in right earnestness with transparency. 

Key features of the recommendations 

There are several forward looking and desirable features in the systemic reform package presented by the expert committee catering to the present needs as well as for the future, as Bengaluru’s population is estimated to cross 2 crore by the year 2040. A few important measures among them are:

i. A three- tiered structure with the Greater Bengaluru Authority (GBA) as an overarching local planning and coordination agency as the first tier at the metropolitan level; the five MCs and ten zones as decentralised and autonomous local governments with full empowerment through devolution of power and resources as the second tier; and empowered ward governance structure with decision making authority, funds and community participation through ward committees as the third tier at the hyperlocal level;

ii. Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC) for visioning, strategic planning for social and economic development, and to facilitate smooth and planned urbanisation of villages falling under the metropolitan region to sustain and boost Bengaluru’s brand as a pre-eminent destination for innovation and investment; 

iii. Greater Bengaluru Finance Commission (GBFC) to ensure equitable distribution of resources to all the tiers and all constituent MCs;

iv. Greater Bengaluru Services Ombudsman (GBSO) to address citizens’ grievances expeditiously and ensure accountability in the system; 

v. A Mayor with a five-year term for each of the five MCs. The manner of appointment of the Mayor (as to whether directly elected or a Mayor in Council on the lines of the cabinet system) though needs careful considerations to be consistent with the parliamentary model of government at the state and the national level and avoid practical challenges in delivering impactful governance; 

vi. The GBA is to be headed initially by the chief minister and is to be gradually transitioned to a directly elected Metropolitan Mayor within a period of 10 years. The other members of the GBA will include the mayors of the constituent MCs, MLAs, representatives of Zilla Parishads (ZPs), parastatals and domain experts; and

vii. Competitive and adequate human resources with innovative options such as lateral entry for sectoral professionals and domain experts.

These reforms with improved processes and provisions for building capacities, as well as improved transparency, accountability and citizen participation mechanisms are intended to enhance the trust of citizens in their local government, which in turn would result in improved tax remittances, improved fiscal discipline, decrease in red tape and corruption, among other things, besides leading to the overarching objective of improving quality of life in the city. 

Navigating potential challenges to go the whole hog on reforms 

There are, however, a few challenges that call for the government to seek remedies pragmatically. There could also be areas of improvement to the design, which the government must be open to consider as it comes up with the draft bill.

Firstly, in a situation when different political parties rule the different MCs under the proposed GBA and/or if the party ruling the state (which would control the GBA) is different from those ruling the constituent MCs, there is a significant risk of governance crisis. Such situations can only be avoided by: 

a) full empowerment of the MCs in terms of functions, funds and functionaries;

b) clear rules and procedures for transaction of work and seamless coordination between MCs and among other agencies under the GBA and the MPC; and

c) the political leadership exhibiting a greater degree of maturity and statesmanship by rising above narrow partisan considerations in larger public interest. 

Secondly, the inordinate delay in conducting BBMP elections after the expiry of its five-year term every time, non-operationalisation of the MPC for over 30 years, flawed delimitation and reservation exercises, dismal coordination among agencies, lack of consistent two-way communication between citizens and BBMP/GoK on major policy and projects doesn't inspire confidence in an effective and competent GBA and the reformed governance framework. Therefore, at the outset, it is important for the state government to take all stakeholders into confidence by articulating whether the proposed bill would adopt the complete package of the expert committee and publishing the proposed framework and the new bill in the public domain and giving wide publicity to receive constructive feedback from all quarters. It is very important for the government to treat and position this exercise as a collaborative governance initiative and not as a unilateral political move.

Thirdly, it is important for the state government to build adequate safeguards in the proposed restructuring law to instil confidence among all stakeholders to ensure that it is a reform effort to reimagine and reboot Bengaluru’s governance in the true spirit of the tech city and avoid the temptation to reduce it to a mere tactic to delay local elections or make petty political gains. A few steps that the government may take in this direction are by: 

i. entrusting the State Election Commission (SEC) with the responsibility of delimitation of wards as well as assigning reservations to them;

ii. respecting the democratic process by committing to a reasonable time frame of say six months to conduct elections to the reorganised Greater Bengaluru entities and operationalising the GBA;

iii. defining a practical and workable design to elect (direct or indirect) the  Metropolitan Mayor  and abiding by the timeline of 10 years for transitioning the leadership of the GBA from the state government to the Metropolitan Mayor; and

iv. being open to constructive inputs from the citizens as well as the opposition on any matter on the draft bill to further improve the overall design of the framework.

Summing up, if the government proceeds in the spirit of reforms, and true decentralisation and empowerment as envisaged under the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, the reorganised Greater Bengaluru governance framework could present a much needed model for other metro cities in India to emulate in due course.